If, notwithstanding this, praise is
won from mankind, some extraneous motive must prevail. I am not here
referring to the disgraceful way in which mutual friends will puff one
another into a reputation; outside of that, an effectual motive is
supplied by the feeling that next to the merit of doing something
oneself, comes that of correctly appreciating and recognizing what
others have done. This accords with the threefold division of heads
drawn up by Hesiod[1] and afterwards by Machiavelli[2] _There are_,
says the latter, _in the capacities of mankind, three varieties:
one man will understand a thing by himself; another so far as it is
explained to him; a third, neither of himself nor when it is put
clearly before him_. He, then, who abandons hope of making good his
claims to the first class, will be glad to seize the opportunity of
taking a place in the second. It is almost wholly owing to this state
of things that merit may always rest assured of ultimately meeting
with recognition.
[Footnote 1: _Works and Days_, 293.]
[Footnote 2: _The Prince_, ch. 22.]
To this also is due the fact that when the value of a work has once
been recognized and may no longer be concealed or denied, all men vie
in praising and honoring it; simply because they are conscious
of thereby doing themselves an honor.
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