For some time I nursed the thought of killing him
in a duel; but this would not lead to anything. Aniela would never
marry the man who had killed her husband; then, like a common
criminal, I began to think of other ways. And what is the strangest
thing of all, I discovered ways which human justice would not be able
to detect. Foolishness! vain thoughts! pure theory!
Kromitzki need have no fear for his life; thoughts like these will
never be acted upon. I should not kill him if I could do it without
more responsibility than is incurred in crushing a spider; should not
kill him if we two were alone together on a desert island. If one
could divide the human brain as one cuts in two an apple, and lay
bare its thoughts, it would be found that mine is honeycombed with
murderous thoughts. What is more, I am well aware that if I refrain
from killing Kromitzki it is not by reason of any moral principle
contained in the law "Thou shalt do no murder." This law I have
already violated morally. I refrain from killing him because some
remnants of chivalric tradition bar my way; because my refined nerves
would not permit me to commit a brutal deed; in short, I am too far
removed from primitive man to be physically competent to the task,
though morally I slay him every day. And now I ask myself whether, in
presence of a higher judgment, I should be held responsible, as if I
had committed the deed.
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